We examine the implications of pre-grant publication (PP) of patent applications in the context of a cumulative innovation model. We show that PP leads to fewer applications and fewer inventions, but it may raise the probability that new technologies will reach the product market and thereby enhances consumer surplus and possibly total welfare as well.
Introduction
The two main objectives of patent systems are to encourage investments in R&D by granting inventors a temporary monopoly over the use of their inventions and to facilitate the dissemination of R&D knowledge. One aspect of patent systems that re ‡ects the desire to balance these con ‡icting objectives is the requirement to publicly disclose pre-grant patent applications after 18 months from the date of application. This requirement, which is in place in practically every industrialized country (see Ragusa 1992) , implies that inventors may face the risk that their knowledge will be made public even if eventually their patent applications are rejected. Not surprisingly, opponents of this requirement argue that this risk may discourage innovations, especially by small independent inventors who lack the means to vigorously protect their intellectual property. A notable exception to the 18 months rule is the current U.S. patent system which allows applicants to keep their patent applications con…dential until an actual patent is issued, provided that they do not seek patent protection in another country in which the 18 months rule applies. 1 In this paper we examine the implications of pre-grant publication of patent applications in the context of a cumulative innovation model. In this model, two …rms engage in an R&D process aimed at developing a new commercial technology. Our analysis begins when one of the two …rms has managed to accumulate enough interim R&D knowledge to …le for a patent. 2 We then examine what are the e¤ects of pre-grant patent publication (PP) on the incentives of the leading …rm to apply for a patent on its interim R&D knowledge, and on the R&D investments of the two …rms which determine their likelihood to successfully develop the new commercial technology.
In principle, pre-grant patent publication (PP) may have two main e¤ects: …rst, it creates a technical spillover because the lagging …rm gets access to the leading …rm's interim R&D knowledge when the patent application is made public even if the application is eventually rejected. Second, PP may credibly reveal to the lagging …rm that the leading …rm is indeed leading and may also a¤ect its beliefs about the extent of this lead. In this paper we focus on the …rst, technological spillover, e¤ect of PP. This e¤ect …gures prominently in the public debate in the U.S. about PP. 1 The Patent Reform Act of 2007 (H. R. 1908 and S.1145 of the 110th Congress) proposes to eliminate the exemption.
Until the passage of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) in 1999, all patent applications in the U.S. were kept con…dential until a patent was actually granted. Since 1999, approximately 10% of all applicants opt-out of publication (FTC, 2005, p. 11) .
2 For instance, in the context of biotechnology, the interim R&D knowledge could represent a research tool like a cell line, chemical reagent, or antibody which is used in research but need not have an independent commercial value.
We show that the implications of PP depend on the strength of patent protection, which depends in our model on two factors: (i) the likelihood that the patent o¢ ce will grant the leading …rm a patent on its interim R&D knowledge, and (ii) the likelihood that the patent will be upheld in court. PP matters however only if patent protection is strong or intermediate because under
weak protection, the leading …rm does not …le for a patent even when patent applications are kept con…dential. On the other hand, when patent protection is strong, the leading …rm …les for a patent even when a PP is in place. But since PP creates a technological spillover, it induces the leading …rm to cut its R&D investment while inducing the lagging …rm to invest more. When the cost of R&D is quadratic, PP raises the overall likelihood that the new technology will reach the product market, and hence it bene…ts consumers. If in addition the marginal cost of R&D is su¢ ciently large, then PP also raises social welfare (measured as the sum of the expected consumers'surplus and expected pro…ts). On the other hand, PP hurts the leading …rm and hence, weakens its incentives to accumulate interim R&D knowledge in the …rst place.
Things are more subtle when patent protection is intermediate. Now the leading …rm …les for a patent when patent applications are con…dential but not when they are made public. Moreover, the e¤ect of PP on the R&D investments depends on the likelihood that patents will be upheld in court: when this likelihood is large, PP induces the leading …rm to cut its R&D investment while inducing the lagging …rm to invest more. When the likelihood that patents will be upheld in court is small, PP has an ambiguous e¤ect on the R&D investments. Nonetheless, when the cost of R&D is quadratic, PP still bene…ts consumers regardless of the likelihood that patents will be upheld in court. And, when the marginal cost of R&D is su¢ ciently large, PP enhances social welfare if patents are likely to be upheld in court, but it decreases social welfare otherwise.
The economic literature has already studied various aspects of patent laws, including the optimal length and breadth of patents (e.g., Nordhaus, 1969; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, We are aware of only two papers that examine the implication of PP. Aoki and Prusa (1996) assume that PP reveals information about the quality choice of the …rst …ler. They show that this information allows …rms to coordinate their R&D investments and achieve a more collusive outcome.
Unlike the current paper though, the decision to patent is not endogenous, …ling for a patent does not create a technological spillover, and patenting does not allow the …rst …ler to exclude its rival from the product market. Johnson and Popp (2003) examine citation analysis on all U.S. domestic patents from 1976 to 1996 and …nd that more "signi…cant" patents (those that are subsequently cited more often) tend to take longer through the application process and hence are more likely to be a¤ected by PP. Moreover, their analysis suggests that earlier disclosure should lead to faster di¤usion of R&D knowledge. While faster di¤usion bene…ts future inventors, it hurts the …ling inventors and may therefore make them more reluctant to …le for patents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the model and in
Sections 3 and 4 we study the equilibrium under the PP and CF systems. In Section 5 we compare the two …ling systems in terms of the equilibrium patenting and investment behavior of the two …rms and use the results to examine the implications of PP for consumers' surplus and social welfare. We then consider the possibility that the two …rms will engage in licensing in Section 6, and in Section 7 we examine the implications of PP for the …rms'incentives to accumulate interim R&D knowledge. We conclude in Section 8. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
Two …rms engage in a R&D process aimed at developing a new commercial technology. Suppose that the R&D process has reached a critical point where one of the two …rms, …rm 1, has accumulated enough interim knowledge to apply for a patent. This knowledge represents, say, a research tool or some basic technology which lowers the cost of R&D in the rest of the R&D process. Although the patent (if granted) covers only the interim knowledge of …rm 1, it nonetheless allows it to sue …rm 2 for patent infringement if …rm 2 eventually manages to develop the new technology. In most of the paper, we shall assume that when …rm 1 holds a patent, it always sues …rm 2 when the latter develops the new technology; this assumption can be justi…ed on the grounds that …rm 1 wishes to develop reputation for vigorously protecting its intellectual property. In Section 6 we shall relax this assumption and consider ex post licensing which takes place when …rm 1 fails to develop the new technology while …rm 2 succeeds. 3 The cost of applying for a patent is that some of …rm 1's interim knowledge is spilled over to …rm 2 either through the patent application (if it is made public), or through an actual patent (if and when it is granted). 4
Given …rm 1's patenting decision, but before the patent o¢ ce makes a decision, the two …rms decide how much to invest in the rest of the R&D process. The investment of each …rm determines its eventual probability of succeed. We assume that the outcome of the R&D process is binary: each …rm either succeeds to develop the new technology or it fails and develops nothing.
Once the R&D process ends, the two …rms compete in the product market. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1 . 
The …ling system
We consider two …ling systems: under a pre-grant patent publication system (PP system), the contents of patent applications are automatically published after a certain period of time from the application date (typically 18 months). Under a con…dential …ling system (CF system), patent applications are kept con…dential until a patent is granted; if an application is rejected, then no information is revealed.
In practice, patent protection is imperfect both because patent applications are sometimes rejected by the patent o¢ ce if they are not deemed su¢ ciently novel, useful, or non-obvious, and because actual patents are not always upheld in court. 5 We capture these imperfections by assuming 3 Another possibility is that …rm 1 will license its interim R&D knowledge to …rm 2 ex ante, before the outcome of the R&D process is decided. For analysis of this kind of licensing, see Spiegel (2008) . 4 This tradeo¤ is reminiscent of the tradeo¤ in Horstman, MacDonalds, and Slivinski (1985) , although the technological spillover in their model arises because patenting reveals to the lagging …rm how pro…table it would be to immitate the leading …rm. For a related tradeo¤, see Erkal (2005) . 5 In 2003, the grant rates were 59:9% at the EPO, 49:9% at the JPO, and 64% at the USPTO (USPTO, 2004, Table 4 ). Allison and Lemley (1998) …nd that out of the 300 …nal patent validity decisions by U.S. courts during the that …rm 1's patent application is approved with probability 2 [0; 1], and if …rm 1 sues …rm 2 for patent infringement, then it wins in court with probability 2 [0; 1]. 6 Throughout we treat and as exogenous parameters. 7
The cost of R&D Given …rm 1's …ling decision, but before the patent o¢ ce decides whether to grant …rm 1 a patent, …rms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose how much to invest in the rest of the R&D process. 8 For analytical convenience, we shall assume that the two …rms directly choose their probabilities of success, q 1 and q 2 , and these choices determine their respective R&D cost functions, which are given by C(q 1 ) and C(q 2 ), where > 1 because …rm 2 does not have full access to …rm 1's interim knowledge. We assume that C( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and strictly convex, with C 0 (0) = 0. 9 The value of depends on the degree of technological spillover which in turn depends on whether …rm 1 applies for a patent and on which …ling system is in place. We assume that the value of is lowest and equals L if …rm 1 applies for a patent and a PP system is in place;
in that case, …rm 2 gets access to …rm 1's interim knowledge through …rm 1's patent application. . 6 The assumption that patent protection is imperfect has also been made elsewhere. Meurer (1989) , Anton and Yao (2003 , 2004 ), and Choi (1999 assume that patents can be challenged in court and may be ruled as invalid, but the possibility that patent applications may be rejected plays no role in these papers. Kabla (1996) assumes that patent applications may be rejected, but does not consider the possibility that patents may not be upheld in court. Waterson (1990) and Crampes and Langinier (2002) assume that suing for patent infringement is costly so patentholders do not always sue imitators. Finally, Crampes and Langinier (1998) show that under certain conditions, …rms may choose not renew their patents in order to conceal favorable market information from potential entrants. 7 According to the enablement doctrine of patent law, "claims ought to be bounded to a signi…cant degree by what the disclosure enables, over and beyond prior art" (Merges and Nelson, 1994, p.10 9 Given that C( ) is increasing, there is a 1 : 1 relationship between the probability of success and the cost of acheiving it so it is equaly possible to assume that the two …rms choose how much to spend on R&D and these choices determine their respective probabilities of success.
The value of is intermediate and equals M if a patent is granted and a CF system is in place; …rm 2 then gets access to …rm 1's only through the patent itself. Finally, the value of is largest and equals H if either …rm 1 does not apply for a patent, or if it does but its patent application is rejected and a CF system is in place. In both cases, there is no technological spillover. 10 We assume that the fact that …rm 1's cost of R&D is lower is common knowledge. As mentioned in the Introduction, without this assumption, PP would not only create a technological spillover, but would also reveal to …rm 2 that …rm 1's cost is C(q) and not higher. This will a¤ect …rm 1's incentive to …le for a patent under the PP system. In the current paper, however, we wish to focus on the technological spillover e¤ect and hence eliminate the e¤ect of PP on …rm 2's beliefs by adopting the common knowledge assumption. 11
Competition in the product market
Once the R&D process ends, the two …rms compete in the product market. 3 The Pre-Grant Patent Publication (PP) system
When …rm 1 …les for a patent under the PP system, it can prevent …rm 2 from bringing the new technology to the product market (if …rm 2 develops it) with probability , which is the probability that a patent is granted and is upheld in court. Hence, re ‡ects the e¤ective patent protection that …rm 1 enjoys. Recalling that the success probabilities of …rms 1 and 2 are q 1 and q 2 , the expected payo¤s of the two …rms are
and
The …rst bracketed term in (1) is …rm 1's payo¤ when it succeeds to develop the new technology.
With probability q 2 (1 ), …rm 2 also succeeds and is free to use the new technology in the product market, so …rm 1's payo¤ is yy ; with probability 1 q 2 (1 ), …rm 2 either fails or else it succeeds but it is prevented from using the new technology, so …rm 1's payo¤ is yn . The second bracketed term in (1) represents the corresponding expressions when …rm 1 fails to develop the new technology. The interpretation of equation (2) is similar. Firm 2's cost is L C(q 2 ) because …rm 2 gets access to …rm 1's interim knowledge through …rm 1's patent application.
Absent …ling, …rm 1 cannot prevent …rm 2 from using the new technology if …rm 2 develops it. Hence, the expected payo¤s of the two …rms are
These expressions di¤er from the corresponding expressions in the …ling subgame in two ways:
…rst, the probability that …rm 2 uses the new technology in the product market is now q 2 instead of q 2 (1 ). Second, absent …ling, there is no technological spillover, so …rm 2's cost of R&D is
Let R 1 (q 2 jF ) and R 2 (q 1 jF ) be the best-response functions in the …ling subgame; these functions are de…ned implicitly by
Similarly, the bestresponse functions in the no-…ling subgame, R 1 (q 2 jN F ) and R 2 (q 1 jN F ), are de…ned implicitly by
= 0: Assumptions A1 and A2 ensure that the best-response functions in both subgames are well-de…ned and single-valued. The best-response functions are downward sloping in the (q 1 ; q 2 ) space (q 1 and q 2 are strategic substitutes) if yn + ny yy nn > 0 and are upward sloping (q 1 and q 2 are strategic complements) if < 0. To interpret , note that it can be written as ( yn nn ) ( yy ny ), where yn nn is the extra pro…ts generated by the new technology when the rival fails to develop it, and yy ny is the corresponding extra pro…t when the rival succeeds. When > 0, having the new technology is more pro…table when the rival does not have it and conversely when < 0.
The Nash equilibrium in the …ling subgame, (q 1 F ; q 2 F ), is determined by the intersection of R 1 (q 2 jF ) and R 2 (q 1 jF ), while the Nash equilibrium in the no-…ling subgame, (q 1 N F ; q 2 N F ), is determined by the intersection of R 1 (q 2 jN F ) and R 2 (q 1 jN F ). Assumptions A1 and A2 ensure that (q 1 F ; q 2 F ) and (q 1 N F ; q 2 N F ) are unique and lie inside the unit square (recall that q 1 and q 2 are probabilities and hence must be between 0 and 1). 13 To see how the e¤ective patent protection, , a¤ects the R&D investments, note that
. Hence, when increases, R 1 (q 2 jF ) shifts outward if > 0 (q 1 and q 2 are strategic substitutes) and inwards if < 0 (q 1 and q 2 are strategic complements); by contrast, Assumption A1 ensures that R 2 (q 1 jF ) always shifts inward. As a result, q 1 F increases with if > 0 and decreases with if < 0, while q 2 F always decreases with irrespective of . Intuitively, as increases, …rm 2 is less likely to bring the new technology to the product market and hence its marginal bene…t from R&D falls; as a result …rm 2 invests less. As for …rm 1, note that its marginal bene…t from R&D is a weighted average of yn nn and yy ny . When increases, …rm 1 is more likely to block …rm 2 from using the new technology and hence its extra pro…ts is more likely to be yn nn rather than The proof appears in a technical appendix which is available at www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel are a¤ected by . 14 Panels a-c show the case where > 0 (q 1 and q 2 are strategic substitutes) and Panels d-f show the case where < 0 (q 1 and q 2 are strategic complements). Panels a and d show that in the extreme case where = 0 (…rm 1 gets no patent protection), R 1 (q 2 jF ) = R 1 (q 2 jN F ).
On the other hand, given that L > H , the marginal cost of q 2 is lower in the …ling subgame, so
Hence, the equilibrium point in the …ling subgame, F 0 , lies northwest of the equilibrium point in the no-…ling subgame, N F , if > 0 and northeast of N F if < 0. As increases, R 1 (q 2 jF ) shifts to the right when > 0 and to the left when < 0. By contrast, R 2 (q 1 jF ) shifts down irrespective of . Panels b and e show that as a result, the equilibrium point in the …ling subgame shifts southeast (southwest) from
. Panels c and f show that when
Notice that an increase in always leads to decrease in q 2 F , but leads to an increase in q 1 F if > 0 and a decrease in q 1
be the Nash equilibrium payo¤s of …rm 1 in the …ling and in the no-…ling subgames, and de…ne 2 F and 2 N F similarly. Then, we can prove the following result (the proof, along with all other proofs, is in the Appendix):
Proposition 1: (…rm 1's …ling decision under the PP system.) There exists a unique critical value of , denoted c , where
Proposition 1 implies that …rm 1 …les for a patent under the PP system if and only if the e¤ective patent protection, , exceeds a threshold level, c . Intuitively, …rm 1 does not …le for a patent when is small because then it loses some of its tecnological advantage, without enjoying much protection against imitation. As increases, patents receive stronger protection so …ling become more attractive to …rm 1. When > c , …rm 1's bene…t from raising its chance to block …rm 2 from using the new technology exceeds the associated loss of technological advantage and hence …rm 1 …les for a patent.
Proposition 1 also shows that the threshold c is bounded from above by 1 L = H . This implies that we should expect more patent applications when (i) L is high (PP creates a relatively small technological spillover so …rm 1 does not lose much by …ling for a patent), and (ii) H is low (…rm 1's interim knowledge gives it only a small advantage over …rm 2 and hence …rm 1 has little to lose by …ling). 
Con…dential Filing
Absent …ling, the expected payo¤s of the two …rms are still given by equations (3) and (4) and hence the Nash equilibrium in the no-…ling subgame continues to be (q 1 N F ; q 2 N F ). Moreover, …rm 1's expected payo¤ when it …les for a patent continues to be given by equation (1) because it can still prevent …rm 2 from bringing the new technology to the product market with probability , irrespective of whether its patent application is made public. Hence, the best-response function of …rm 1 in the …ling subgame remains R 1 (q 2 jF ), exactly as in PP system.
The only di¤erence between that PP and the CF systems is that now, …rm 2's expected payo¤ in the …ling subgame is no longer given by equation (2); instead it is given by
where M + (1 ) H . This expression di¤ers from equation (2) only in …rm 2's cost of R&D, which is now higher and given by C(q 2 ) instead of L C(q 2 ). The reason for this is that under the CF system, there is a technological spillover only when a patent is actually granted. This event occurs with probability ; with probability 1 , …rm 1's patent application is rejected and there is no spillover.
The best-response function of …rm 2 in the …ling subgame, R 2 (q 1 jF ), is de…ned implicitly by @ 2 (q 1 ;q 2 jF ) @q 2 = 0. Assumptions A1 and A2 ensure that it is well de…ned and single valued. Moreover, it is downward sloping in the (q 1 ; q 2 ) space (q 1 and q 2 are strategic substitutes) if > 0 and upward sloping (q 1 and q 2 are strategic complements) if < 0. A Nash equilibrium in the …ling subgame,
, is determined by the intersection of R 1 (q 2 jF ) and R 2 (q 1 jF ). Assumptions A1 and A2
ensure that (q 1 F ; q 2 F ) is unique and lies inside the unit square. To examine the e¤ect of patent protection on the R&D investments, note from equation (5) that the likelihood that …rm 1 gets a patent, , a¤ects the …ling subgame not only through the e¤ective patent protection, , but also through …rm 2's cost of R&D. Hence, unlike the PP system, now and do not have the exact same e¤ect on the equilibrium. We begin by noting that as increases, …rm 2 is less likely to use the new technology in the product market, so its marginal bene…t from R&D falls. But since …rm 2 is also more likely to get access to …rm 1's interim knowledge, its marginal cost of R&D falls as well. To examine the net e¤ect, note that
where the second equality follows by substituting for C 0 (q 2 ) from the …rst order condition, @ 2 (q 1 ;q 2 jF ) @q 2 = 0 and rearranging terms. Hence, when increases, R 2 (q 1 jF ) shifts inward if > 1 M = H and outward if < 1 M = H . As for …rm 1, note that
Hence, when > 1 M = H , the situation is similar to the PP case: q 1 F increases with if > 0 and decreases if < 0, while q 2 F always decreases with irrespective of . On the other hand, when < 1 M = H , an increase in has an ambiguous e¤ect on the R&D investments.
As for , its e¤ect on the R&D investments is similar to the e¤ect of under the PP system. That is, q 1 F increases with if > 0 and decreases with if < 0, while q 2 F always decreases with irrespective of . Using 1
to denote the equilibrium payo¤s in the …ling subgame, and recalling that as in Section 3, the equilibrium payo¤s in the no-…ling subgame are 1 N F and 2 N F , we can prove the following result:
Proposition 2: (…rm 1's …ling decision under the CF system.) For each > 0, there exists a unique critical value of , denoted^ , where^ 2 (0; 1
Proposition 2 implies that given the likelihood of getting a patent, , …rm 1 …les for a patent under the CF system if and only if the likelihood that the patent will be upheld in court exceeds a threshold level,^ , which is bounded from above by (1 = H ) = .
5 The implications of PP for R&D, patenting, and welfare
Having examined the two …ling systems in isolation, we now compare them in order to determine the impact of PP on …rm 1's propensity to …le for a patent on its interim knowledge, on the R&D investments of the two …rms, and on consumer surplus and social welfare.
The e¤ect of PP on patenting behavior and on the R&D investments
As a preliminary step, we begin by comparing the equilibrium R&D investments and expected payo¤s under the two …ling systems, assuming that …rm 1 …les for a patent (note however that …rm 1 need not have the same propensity to …le for a patent under the two systems). We do not need to make a similar comparison when …rm 1 does not …le for a patent since then PP is irrelevant.
Lemma 1: (Comparing the equilibrium investment levels and expected payo¤ s in the …ling subgame under the two …ling systems.) Suppose that …rm 1 …les for a patent under both systems. Then,
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 3 . The expected marginal cost of …rm 2 is higher under the CF system since then there is a technological spillover only if and when …rm 1 gets a patent. Consequently, R 2 (q 1 jF ) lies below R 2 (q 1 jF ). Since the best-response function of …rm 1, R 1 (q 2 jF ), is the same under the two systems, the equilibrium point under PP, F , is attained northwest of the equilibrium point under CF, F , if > 0 and northeast of F if < 0. Part (ii) of Lemma 1 shows that …rm 1 is worse-o¤ …ling for a patent under PP; intuitively this is because PP creates a larger technological spillover than CF. Part (ii) of the lemma also shows that whenever > 0, …rm 2 is better-o¤ under PP. This is due not only to the larger technological spillover that …rm 2 enjoys under PP, but also due to the fact that whenever > 0, …rm 1 invests less in R&D and is therefore less likely to bring the new technology to the product market. When < 0, …rm 1 invests more under PP so the overall e¤ect of PP on …rm 2 is ambiguous.
We are now ready to compare …rm 1's propensity to …le for a patent under the two systems.
Proposition 3: (…rm 1's …ling decision under the PP and CF …ling systems.) Firm 1 does not …le for a patent under both …ling systems if ^ , …les for a patent under both systems if > c = , and …les for a patent only under the CF system if^ < c = .
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 4 in the ( ; ) space. When ^ , patents receive weak protection since they are relatively hard to defend in court. Consequently, …rm 1 does not …le for a patent under neither …ling system. Examples for industries with weak patent protection include some mature industries like textile, food processing, and fabricated metal products (Arundel and Kabala 1998, Levin et. al., 1987) . When > c = , patents receive strong protection since they are likely to be upheld in court; hence, …rm 1 …les for a patent under both …ling systems. Examples for industries where patents are regarded as providing strong protection include pharmaceuticals, organic chemicals, and pesticides (Arundel and Kabala 1998 , Levin et. al., 1987 , Mans…eld, 1986 (Levin et al., 1987 , Mans…eld, 1986 .
Proposition 3 has at least three important implications for PP which are now stated in the following corollaries. First, Proposition 3 implies that there are parameter values for which …rm 1 …les for a patent under the CF system but not under the PP system. Hence, Corollary 1: PP has an adverse e¤ ect on the propensity to …le for patents.
Corollary 1 suggests that PP may discourage the dissemination of R&D knowledge, contrary to what many proponents of this system argue. 15 The reason of course is that proponents of PP overlook the fact that PP has an adverse e¤ect on the propensity to …le for patents. This adverse e¤ect of PP con…rms Gilbert's (1994) intuition that "There is at least a theoretical potential for the publication of applications prior to the patent grants to have adverse incentive e¤ects because of the potential for appropriation of the intellectual property when no patents are ever issued. To 
PP has an ambiguous e¤ ect on q 1 and q 2 .
Tepperman (2002) When patent protection is weak, …rm 1 does not …le for a patent so PP is irrelevant. When patent protection is strong, …rm 1 …les for a patent under both systems, but PP hurts it because it leads to a larger technological spillover. PP also hurts …rm 1 when patent protection is intermediate, because then …rm 1 chooses to …le for a patent only under the CF system. Since 1 N F is the same under the PP and CF systems, it follows from revealed preferences that …rm 1's choice to …le under the CF system means that it must be better-o¤ than under the PP system. Putnam (1997) estimates that PP is associated with a $479 decrease in the mean value of patents. In our model, …rm 1's loss is even larger since Putnam's estimate is conditional on a patent being granted, while we examine the impact of PP on the unconditional expected pro…t of …rm 1.
In the context of our model, it is natural to assume that small inventors will mainly play the role of …rm 1, because they often lack the capacity and resources needed to absorb the technological spillovers generated by other …rms. Corollary 3 may then explain why the main opposition for adopting a PP system in the U.S. came from small and independent inventors, while the main support for PP came from large corporations.
The implications of PP for consumer surplus and social welfare
In this section, we study the implications of the technological spillover e¤ect of PP on consumers' surplus and social welfare. Our analysis is done from an ex post point of view since at this point we still have not examined the implications of PP for the incentive of the two …rms to accumulate interim R&D knowledge.
Let s yy be the net present value of consumer surplus when both …rms develop the new technology, and de…ne s yn and s nn similarly for the cases where only one …rm, and when neither …rm develop it. The corresponding social welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus and …rms' pro…ts, so w yy = s yy + 2 yy , w yn = s yn + yn + ny , and w nn = s nn + 2 nn . Since the comparison between consumer surplus and social welfare under the two …ling systems is in general very complex, we shall impose the following assumption: A3 C(q) = rq 2 =2, where r > .
Given Assumption A3, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium levels of investment in the …ling subgame under the PP system are
The corresponding levels of investment under the CF system, q 1 F and q 2 F , are similar except that replaces L . In the no- ‡ing subgame, the equilibrium levels of investment, q 1 N F and q 2 N F , are given also given by (6), with = 0 and with H replacing L . By Assumption A3, r > ; together with the assumption that L > 1 1 , this ensures that the equilibrium investments levels are all strictly between 0 and 1.
Substituting the equilibrium levels of investment into equations (1) and (5) and recalling from Propositions 1 and 2 that c is implicitly de…ned by 1 F = 1 N F and^ is implicitly de…ned by 1 F = 1 N F , we can establish the following result:
Lemma 2: Given Assumption A3, patent protection is: 
Expected Consumers'surplus
Holding …rm 1's interim R&D knowledge constant across the two …ling systems, the ex-post expected consumer surplus under both systems when …rm 1 …les for a patent is,
Likewise, the ex-post expected consumer surplus under both systems absent …ling is given by,
Let S F S(q 1 F ; q 2 F jF ) be the equilibrium expected value of consumer surplus under the PP system when there is …ling, and de…ne S F S(q 1 F ; q 2 F jF ) similarly for the CF system. When …rm 1 does not …le for a patent, PP plays no role and the equilibrium expected value of consumer surplus under both …ling systems is given by S N F S(q 1 N F ; q 2 N F jN F ). When patent protection is strong, …rm 1 …les for a patent under both systems. Hence, we need to compare S F and S F . Substituting for q 1 F and q 2 F from equation (6) into (7) yields
where s s yy + s nn 2s yn > 0 by Assumption A4. The expression for S F is identical, except that replaces L .
In the intermediate protection case, …rm 1 …les for a patent under the CF system but not under the PP system. Therefore, we need to compare S F and S N F , where S N F is also given by equation (9) when it evaluated at = 0 and with H replacing L . Intuitively, in the strong protection case ( 1 p L = H ), …rm 1 …les for a patent under both …ling systems. As Lemma 1 shows, PP induces both …rms to invest more if < 0, so consumers are better-o¤ as the new technology is more likely to reach the product market. When > 0, PP induces …rm 2 to invest more and induces …rm 1 to invest less. Given Assumption A3, the former e¤ect dominates, so once again consumers are better-o¤ under PP. Things are more subtle when patent protection is intermediate (
…les for a patent only under the CF system. As increases, patents are more likely to be upheld in court, so …rm 1 is more likely to block …rm 2 from using the new technology in the product market;
hence, consumer surplus under the CF system, S F , decreases with . Under the PP system, …rm 1 does not …le for a patent, so the resulting consumer surplus, S N F , is independent of . Noting that S F = S N F when = (1 p = H )= , it follows that S N F > S F , and moreover, S N F S F is increasing with .
Expected social welfare
Holding …rm 1's interim R&D knowledge constant across the two …ling systems, the (ex post) expected social welfare when …rm 1 …les for a patent is W F = S F + 1 F + F 2 under the PP system, and W F = S F + 1 F + F 2 under the CF system. When …rm 1 does not …le for a patent, the (ex-post) expected social welfare is W N F = S N F + 1 N F + 2 N F . When patent protection is strong, …rm 1 …les for a patent under both systems, so the equilibrium expected social welfare is W F under PP and W F under CF. Given Assumption A3 and using equations (1), (2), (6), and (9),
2 2 2 (10)
The expression for W F is identical except that replaces L .
In the intermediate protection case, …rm 1 …les for a patent only under the CF system, so the equilibrium expected social welfare is W F under CF and W N F under PP, where W N F is identical to W F except that = 0 and H replaces L .
Proposition 5: (The welfare implications of PP.) Suppose that Assumptions A3-A5 hold and let ; moreover, when these conditions hold, the welfare gain (loss) from to PP is larger (smaller) the larger is .
Proposition 5 reveals that the welfare e¤ect of PP depends on r, which measures the slope of the marginal cost of R&D. Intuitively, the R&D cost functions are convex; hence, all else equal, a more even allocation of investments between the two …rms generates an e¢ ciency gain which increases with r. When patent protection is intermediate, things also depend on , which is the likelihood that …rm 1's patent is upheld in court. As increases, …rm 2 becomes less likely to use the new technology and this lowers expected social welfare under the CF system, where …rm 1 …les for a patent. Under PP, 1 does not …le for a patent so there is no similar negative e¤ect.
The timing of PP
In countries that have already adopted the PP system, patent applications are published at 18 months from the …ling date (Ragusa 1992) . We now examine the impact of the timing of publication on social welfare. To this end, we shall assume that an earlier PP leads to a drop in L by generating a larger technological spillover when …rm 1 …les for a patent.
Proposition 6: (The e¤ ect of cutting the time between the …ling date and the publication date.)
Suppose that Assumptions A3-A5 hold. Then, as L falls (publication is made earlier), there are fewer patent applications under the PP system, but so long as r r( L ), the welfare gain from PP, conditional on …ling for a patent, grows larger.
Proposition 6 shows that earlier publication of patent applications has mixed welfare e¤ects:
on the one hand, it increases the cost of patenting, so less R&D knowledge is disseminated. On the other hand, conditional on patents being …led, the welfare gain from PP increases at least when the cost of R&D is su¢ ciently convex (note that this is also the condition for PP to be socially desirable).
These results are in line with Bloch and Markowitz (1996) who study the e¤ects of delays in the mandatory disclosure of interim R&D knowledge on the incentives to invest in a multi-stage R&D race. They …nd that shorter disclosure delays weaken the incentives to accumulate interim R&D knowledge, but conditional on an initial discovery being made, shorter disclosure delays enhance welfare by decreasing the expected time of discovering the …nal commercial product.
Ex post licensing
So far we have assumed that when …rm 1 holds a patent, it always sues …rm 2 for patent infringement when …rm 2 develops the new technology. In this section we relax this assumption. Assuming that yn + ny > 2 yy , …rm 1 will continue to sue …rm 2 for patent infringement when both …rms manage to develop the new technology because the joint payo¤ when …rm 1 wins in court, yn + ny , exceeds the joint payo¤ when …rm 1 does not sue, 2 yy . 17
Things are di¤erent however when …rm 1 fails to develop the new technology, while …rm 2 succeeds. In that case …rm 1 can issue …rm 2 an (ex post) license, which ensures that it will not to sue …rm 2; in return, …rm 2 pays …rm 1 a license fee. The resulting joint payo¤ of the two …rms is then yn + ny . Without ex post licensing, …rm 1 sues …rm 2 and with probability it wins in court and prevents …rm 2 from using the new technology. The resulting joint payo¤ of the two …rms is then 2 nn . With probability 1 , …rm 2 wins in court and is then free to use the new technology, so the joint payo¤ of the two …rms is yn + ny , exactly as in the case of ex post licensing. Comparing the joint payo¤ of the two …rms under ex post licensing, yn + ny , with their joint payo¤ absent ex post licensing, 2 nn + (1 ) ( yn + ny ), reveals that ex post licensing is e¢ cient and generates an expected surplus of ( yn + ny 2 nn ).
To examine the implications of ex post licensing, suppose that …rms 1 and 2, divide the expected surplus from ex post licensing, ( yn + ny 2 nn ), between them in proportions and 1 . Moreover, note that ex post licensing matters only when …rm 1 …les for a patent, a patent is granted, …rm 1 fails to develop the new technology, and …rm 2 succeeds. The probability of this event is (1 q 1 )q 2 . Hence, ex post licensing increases the expected payo¤s of …rms 1 and 2 in the …ling subgame by
Two observations are now immediate. First, 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF ) > 0, so ex post licensing has a direct positive e¤ect on …rm 1's payo¤ when it …les for a patent. Second, 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF ) falls with q 1 , while 2 (q 1 ; q 2 jF ) increases with q 2 , so the best-response function of …rm 1 in the …ling subgame (under both PP and CF) shifts inward, while the best-response function of …rm 2 shifts outward.
Since yn + ny > 2 yy > yy + nn , the best-response functions of the two …rms are strategic 1 7 The assumption that yn + ny > 2 yy holds trivially when …rms 1 and 2 are Bertrand competitors with linear cost functions and the new technology is cost-reducing, because then yn > 0 = yy = nn = ny . Likewise, this assumption holds when …rms 1 and 2 are Cournot competitors with linear demand and cost functions and the new technology is su¢ ciently cost reducing. To illustrate, suppose that the inverse demand function is P = A x1 x2, where xi is the output of …rm i = 1; 2, and let …rm i's marginal cost be 0 if it develops the new technology and k < A=2
otherwise. Then, yn = (A + k) 2 =9, yy = Asubstitutes ( > 0). Consequently, ex post licensing induces …rm 1 to invest less in R&D in the …ling subgame, and it induces …rm 2 to invest more. Since this indirect e¤ect lowers the equilibrium pro…t of …rm 1 in the …ling subgame, the overall e¤ect of ex post licensing on …rm 1's incentive to …le for a patent is in general ambiguous. Nonetheless, given that the direct and indirect e¤ects of ex post licensing on …rm 1's payo¤ are the same under the PP and CF systems, ex post licensing does not a¤ect the main qualitative conclusions of our analysis.
The incentives to accumulate interim R&D knowledge
Up to this point, we have focused on the implications of PP after …rm 1 has already accumulated enough interim knowledge to …le for a patent. In this section we ask how PP a¤ects the …rms' incentives to accumulate interim R&D knowledge in the …rst place. To this end, let B denote the di¤erence between the expected pro…ts of …rm 1 (the leading …rm) and …rm 2 (the lagging …rm). We argue that the …ling system that leads to a higher B, provides a stronger incentive to accumulate interim R&D knowledge. As before, we only need to study the strong and intermediate protection cases because PP is irrelevant when patent protection is weak.
In the strong protection case, …rm 1 …les for a patent under both …ling systems, so B =
F under the PP system, and B = B F 1 F 2 F under the CF system. Hence, the e¤ect of PP depends on the sign of B F B F . By Lemma 1, when > 0, then 1 F < 1 F and 2 F > 2 F , so it is clear that B F < B F . When < 0, the relationship between 2 F and 2 F is in general ambiguous. To examine the sign of B F B F , we therefore impose Assumption A3. Using equations (1), (2), and (6),
B F is given by the same expression except that replaces L .
When protection is intermediate, PP induces …rm 1 to stop …ling for a patent, so B =
Under CF, …rm 1 continues to …le for a patent, so as before, B = B F . The e¤ect of PP, then, depends on the sign of B N F B F , where B N F is given by equation (11) with H replacing L and with = 0:
Proposition 7: (The e¤ ect of PP on the incentives to accumulate interim R&D knowledge.) Given Assumption A3, PP weakens the incentive to accumulate R&D knowledge both when patent protection is strong and when it is intermediate. The negative e¤ ect of PP on the incentive to accumulate interim R&D knowledge decreases with when patent protection is strong but increases with when patent protection is intermediate.
Proposition 7 supports the concern that PP might discourage investments in R&D. Given the importance of R&D knowledge, this adverse e¤ect of PP should be given a serious consideration.
In addition, the proposition shows that as patents become more likely to be upheld in court, this drawback of PP becomes less signi…cant if patent protection is strong, but more signi…cant if patent protection is intermediate. The reason for this di¤erence is that when protection is strong, …rm 1 …les for a patent under both …ling systems. As patents become more likely to be upheld in court, PP is less detrimental to …rm 1 and less bene…cial to …rm 2, so its negative e¤ect on the incentive to accumulate interim knowledge diminishes. When patent protection is intermediate, …rm 1 does not …le for a patent under the PP system, so does not a¤ect the incentive to invest. But, since an increase in boosts the incentive to invest under the CF system, the detrimental e¤ect of PP on the incentive to invest (i.e., the di¤erence between B N F and B F ) increases.
Conclusion
We have studied a cumulative innovation model in which one …rm has accumulated interim R&D knowledge and needs to decide whether or not to apply for a patent. The bene…t from applying is that if a patent is granted, the …rm can sue its rival for patent infringement in case the rival successfully develops a new commercial technology. Applying for a patent is costly however because it creates a technological spillover which diminishes the technological advantage of the applicant. This spillover is larger under a PP system because then the rival gets access to the applicant's knowledge through the patent application (even if eventually the application is turned down) rather than through the actual patent (if and when it is granted). Our analysis focuses on the implications of this spillover e¤ect.
Our results suggest that PP discourage patent applications in industries in which patent protection is intermediate and may weaken the incentives to invent. At the same time, holding the number of inventions …xed, PP may raise the likelihood that new technologies will reach the product market and may therefore bene…t consumers and may also enhance social welfare.
Although our model is quite general (we do not assume a particular type of competition in the product market, we do not need to distinguish between product and process inventions, and we derive many of the results without assuming a particular functional form for the R&D cost functions), it is clear that further analysis is needed before we have a good understanding of the implications of PP. In what follows we brie ‡y mention three possible extensions. First, in a dynamic model of R&D in which …rms continuously accumulate interim R&D knowledge, …rms need to decide not only whether to apply for a patent but also when to do it. Filing early is risky because the application is less likely to be accepted; on the other hand, an early …ling contains less knowledge and hence leads to a smaller technological spillover. Applying early can also play a defensive role because the …rm is not only able to sue rivals earlier, but can also preempt rivals from getting their own patent. This ensures that the …rm will not be sued for patent infringement by rivals.
Second, it is possible to extend our analysis by allowing …rm 1 to strategically decide how much interim knowledge to include in its patent application: including more knowledge increases the probability that a patent will be granted but also increases the degree of technological spillover.
Third, when …rms have private information regarding the extent of their interim R&D knowledge (or even the fact that they are trying to develop the new technology), PP reveals this information to rivals earlier and for sure. This will obviously a¤ect the incentives to …le. Moreover, …rms may be tempted to abuse the PP system and …le for a patent in order to fool their rivals into believing that they are ahead in the race. At the same time, PP may eliminate "submarine" patents, by giving …rms a due warning about patent applications which are in the pipeline. 18 
Appendix
Following are Lemma A1, and the proofs of Lemmas 1-2, Propositions 1-7, and Corollaries 2-3.
Lemma A1: The e¤ ect of patent protection on the equilibrium R&D investments under the two …ling systems: Proof of Lemma A1: (i) The Nash equilibrium in the …ling subgame is implicitly de…ned by the equations @ 1 (q 1 ;q 2 jF ) @q 1 = 0 and @ 2 (q 1 ;q 2 jF ) @q 2 = 0: Di¤erentiating this system with respect to yields:
where yn + ny yy nn . By Assumption A2, C 00 q 1 F C 00 q 2 F > 2 ; together with the fact that L > 1, it follows that the denominator in both expressions is strictly positive. Hence, (1) and (3) coincide, so
for all q 1 . Hence, q 2 F > q 2 N F (this is true irrespective or whether > 0 or < 0). Next, suppose that = 1 L = H . Then, it is easy to verify that
Recalling that the best-response functions are downward sloping when > 0 and upward sloping when < 0, it follows that q 2 F < q 2 N F .
(ii) The proof is similar to the proof of part (i), except that replaces L and replaces .
Proof of Proposition 1: By equation (3), 1 N F is independent of and . Using the envelope theorem,
Assumption A1 ensures that the bracketed expression and @ 1 F =@q 2 are negative. Since @q 2
c is de…ned implicitly 1 F = 1 N F . Since 1 F increases with , whereas 1 N F is independent of , it su¢ ces to show that 1
(1) and (3) imply that 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF ) = 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jN F ). Consequently,
where the strict inequality follows because @ 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF )=@q 2 < 0 and since Lemma A1 states that q 2 F > q 2 N F when = 0, and the weak inequality is implied by revealed preferences (i.e., the de…nition of q 1 N F ). Next, suppose that = 1 L = H . Then by Lemma A1, q 2 F < q 2 N F . Using equations (1) and (3) and Assumption A1, it is easy to show that 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF ) > 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jN F ) for all > 0. Hence,
where the weak inequality is implied by revealed preferences and the second strict inequality follows because @ 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF )=@q 2 < 0 and since q 2 F < q 2 N F .
Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove the existence of b 2 (0; 1 = H )= , note that b is de…ned
The proofs that 1 F increases with and that 1 F < 1 N F are is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Since 1 N F is independent of , it su¢ ces to show that 1
To this end, recall from Lemma A1 that q 2 F < q 2 N F and recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF ) > 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jN F ) for all > 0. Consequently,
where the weak inequality is implied by revealed preferences and the second strict inequality follows because @ 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF )=@q 2 < 0 and q 2 F < q 2 N F .
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) Follows immediately from Figure 3 .
(ii) Since q 2 F > q 2 F and noting that @ 1 (q 1 ; q 2 jF )=@q 2 < 0,
where the weak inequality follows by revealed preferences.
As for …rm 2, note that if > 0, then q 1 F < q 1 F . Together with the fact that @ 2 (q 1 ; q 2 jF )=@q 1 < 0, it follows that 2 (q 1
where the weak inequality follows from revealed preferences and the second strict inequality follows from equations (2) and (4) by noting that > L .
Proof of Proposition 3: By Propositions 1 and 2, …rm 1 …les for a patent under the PP system if > c = and under the CF system if >^ , where c = is de…ned implicitly by 1 F = 1 N F and ^ is de…ned implicitly by 1 F = 1 N F . Since Proposition 1 and 2 show that
Proof of Corollary 2: When patent protection is strong, …rm 1 …les for a patent under both systems. The e¤ect of PP on the R&D investments follows in this case from part (i) of Lemma 1.
When patent protection is intermediate, …rm 1 …les for a patent only under the CF system. The R&D investment levels are then q 1 N F and q 2 N F under PP and q 1 F and q 2 F under CF. To compare these levels of investment, note that from equations (4) and (5) that R 2 (q 1 jN F ) and R 2 (q 1 jF ), respectively are implicitly de…ned by
Substituting from the
and rearranging terms,
and since the best-response functions are downward sloping, q 1 F > q 2 N F and q 2 F < q 2 N F . If < 0, then R 1 (q 2 jF ) < R 1 (q 2 jN F ) and since the best-response functions are upward sloping, q 1 F < q 2 N F and q 2 F ) and hence the relationship between q 1 N F and q 2 N F and q 1 F and q 2 F is ambiguous.
Proof of Corollary 3:
The reason why PP hurts …rm 1 is explained in the text following the proposition. To see that PP may bene…t …rm 2, suppose …rst that patent protection is strong.
Then …rm 1 …les for a patent under both systems. Since > L , it follows from equations (2) and (4) that 2 (q 1 ; q 2 jF ) > 2 (q 1 ; q 2 jF ). Panel a of Figure 3 shows that when > 0, q 1 F < q 1 F . Given that @ 2 (q 1 ; q 2 jF )=@q 1 < 0, this implies in turn that 2 (q 1 F ; jF ) > 2 (q 1 F ; jF ). Hence, Substituting for the square bracketed term from the …rst order condition, @ 2 (q 1 F ;q 2 F jF ) @q 2 = 0 and recalling that C(q) is strictly convex,
Hence, 2 (q 1 F ; q 2 F jN F ) > 2 F for all > 1 M = H . If q 1 N F < q 1 F , then since @ 2 (q 1 ; q 2 jN F )=@q 1 < 0, it follows that
Proof of Proposition 4:
In the strong protection case, we need to compare S F (consumers' surplus under the CF system) and S F (consumers'surplus under the PP system). Now, Recalling that in the intermediate protection case, (1 p = H )= , we get H (1 ) 2 0, so the …rst line of (13) is positive. The square bracketed expression in the second line is increasing with and it vanishes at = (1 p = H )= ; hence the second line is positive as well, so S N F > S F for all parameter values in the intermediate protection case. Finally, it is straightforward to establish that the …rst line of (13) is increasing with . Since the second line is also increasing with , it follows that the gain of consumers from PP is larger the larger is . The expression outside the square brackets in (14) Recalling from Assumption A3 that r > and noting that Z(r; ) is a convex function of r and that Z 0 ( ; ) < 0 and Z( ; ) < 0, it follows that Z(r; ) > 0, provided that r r( ), wherê r( ) is de…ned in the proposition.
(ii) When protection is intermediate, we need to compare W N F and W F . Noting that W N F = W F when = 0 (in that case = H ), a su¢ cient condition for PP to enhance (lower) welfare is that @W F =@ < 0 (@W F =@ > 0) for all 2 [0; c = ). Using equation (10) The expression inside the square brackets is similar to the expression inside the square brackets in (14) and is therefore positive when r r( ). In that case, the sign of which is negative when r r( ). Thus, W N F does better relative to W F as increases.
Proof of Proposition 6: Under PP, …rm 1 …les for patent if > (1
As L falls, the right side of the inequality increases, so …rm 1 …les for a smaller set of parameters. If the inequality still holds, …rm 1 …les for a patent under both …ling systems, so the welfare e¤ect of PP is given by W F W F , where W F is independent of L , while @W F =@ L < 0 if r r( L ) (see equation (10)). Hence, so long as r r( L ), lowering L boosts the welfare gain from PP.
Proof of Proposition 7:
In the strong protection case, the e¤ect of PP on the incentive to accumulate interim R&D knowledge depends on the sign of the following expression:
(1 ) 2 2 ) (r 2 (1 ) 2 2 ) < 0:
Straightforward calculation reveals that this expression increases with ; hence PP weakens the incentive to invent, but less so as increases.
In the intermediate protection case, the e¤ect of PP depends on the sign of: 
